I’m a philosopher teaching at George Mason University, and the previous head of bioethics education at the John J. Lynch, MD Center for Ethics. My research program is a sustained and evolving engagement with a set of interconnected problems of metaphysical, epistemic, and moral significance in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The problems I have addressed in my dissertation, published articles, and first book project (Decisional Capacity: Medical & Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2026), attend to the roles of reflection and rational deliberation as they pertain to the doxastic justification of beliefs in the philosophy of perception, debates about nonconceptual experience (i.e., the epistemic role of conceptual representational content), and concerns regarding decisional capacity and thus autonomy and agency in a neuroethical context. My approach is fundamentally driven by conceptual analysis with empirical constraint, informed by advances in cognitive science, including critical neuroscience and clinical neurology, empirical psychology, and evolutionary biology. Although the epistemological or ethical questions I have addressed bear their own independent significance, overarchingly, my work points to a connection between systems of moral obligation and responsibility that hang on rational principles, and the epistemology of mind that attends to the justification of beliefs that inform the very rationality responsible for those principles. My conceptual subject matter includes ‘autonomy,’ ‘agency,’ ‘belief,’ ‘reflection/metacognition,’ ‘nonconceptual representational content,’ and what constitutes a concept itself, bringing clarity to questions about our capacity to learn and possess concepts vis-à-vis intentionality, while remaining careful to inform that analysis with relevant, progressive advances in more comparative (and thus less anthropomorphic) cognitive science.